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INTRODUCTION
The harmful effects on global financial stability that accompanied the
2007-2008 financial crisis (the “crisis”) were largely intensified by loose
regulatory practices in the United States’ (U.S.) secondary mortgage market.1
Accordingly, the harm suffered on a global level warrants a comparative
perspective on international securities regulation.2 This Article will examine
several securitization methods in Europe and the U.S. and derive prospective
solutions from these existing approaches that have the potential to address
undue risks associated with asset-backed securities today.
The negative global effects of the subprime mortgage crisis led to a
decrease in investor confidence and a widespread disapproval of the use
of securitization in general, particularly within the secondary mortgage
market.3 Contrary to what many believe, the secondary mortgage market
has numerous benefits and is essential to the growth and stability of the global
economy.4 Unfortunately, poor lending standards and accelerated credit
extensions have mitigated such benefits.5 Moreover, the regulation and
supervision of banking institutions were well behind fast-paced financial
development.6 The U.S.’s regulatory structure allowed banks to increase
their subprime lending rapidly without appropriate oversight.7 U.S. legislators
must revamp regulatory practices to preserve the methods of securitization
that are instrumental to economic development.8

1. Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, INITIATIVE ON BUS.
& PUB. POL’Y BROOKINGS, Nov. 2008, at 8.
2. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING 32 (2008).
3. See Thomas Hale, Securitisation Industry Battles with Stigma, FIN. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/84b7854e-ed2f-11e5-888e-2eadd5fbc4a4 [http://perma.
cc/E3YS-N6TH].
4. See Miguel Segoviano et al., Staff Discussion Note, Securitization: The Road
Ahead, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Jan. 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/
2015/sdn1501.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5P8-2J5N], for a discussion on the numerous benefits
of securitization.
5. See Csaba Rusznak, The Use of Mortgage-Backed Securities in International
Comparative Perspective: Lessons and Insights, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 823, 831 (2010).
6. See HELEN A. GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING
FIELD 66 (2001).
7. See Anup Shah, Global Financial Crisis, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.global
issues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis [http://perma.cc/C8H4-JECE].
8. See Segoviano et al., supra note 4.
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The subprime mortgage crisis followed a sharp rise in defaults on those
loans that underpinned mortgage-backed securities.9 The defaults were
largely the result of increased leveraging and excessive risk-taking by banks
and other financial institutions.10 Many of the world’s most sophisticated
banks bought mortgage-backed securities without adequate due diligence
because of the high returns that were associated with unknown, and probably
unknowable, risks.11 International banks were generally more familiar with
the securitization practices outside the U.S.; regardless, they were subject to
the U.S.’s deficient practices because these mortgage-backed securities
were supervised by U.S. authorities.12
U.S. policymakers responded to the subprime mortgage crisis with a
large set of domestic and international financial reforms focused primarily
on financial stability reviews and large-scale stress tests.13 This legislation
has incorporated some effective tools. However, the legislation fails to
address broader issues with respect to international market interactions, market
failures, investor incentives, and externalities.14 For example, the banks that
originated the mortgages, together with the financial institutions that
repackaged them in the form of mortgage-backed securities, were usually
able to completely externalize (i.e. transfer to others) the default risks.15
The U.S. should look outside its borders and evaluate aspects from
securitization practices in countries like Germany, Italy, and the United

9. Manuel Adelino et al., Loan Originations and Defaults in the Mortgage Crisis:
The Role of the Middle Class, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 1635, 1637 (2016).
10. Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to the Global
Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions 6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 46, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1446.pdf [http://perma.cc/
H774-JBL6].
11. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International
and Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 582 (2010).
12. See id.
13. Kevin Young, Financial Industry Groups’ Adaptation to the Post-Crisis Regulatory
Environment: Changing Approaches to the Policy Cycle, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 460, 460
(2013); see also Rick Bookstaber et al., Stress Tests to Promote Financial Stability: Assessing
Progress and Looking into the Future 3 (U.S. Dep’t of Treasury: Office of Fin. Research,
Working Paper No. 0010, 2013), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/research/Bookstaber
CetinaFeldbergFloodGlasserman_StressTeststoPromoteFinancialStability.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FE2W-U6CF].
14. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 10.
15. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE
MAC CREDIT RISK TRANSFER TRANSACTIONS 2 (2015).
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Kingdom.16 Securitization is common in the international market and
plays an integral part in the sustainability and growth of housing markets in
numerous countries.17 Although U.S. authorities have looked to European
precedents for reform, the U.S. reforms following the subprime mortgage
crisis focused primarily on internal banking procedures, which is contrary
to the general system-wide approach to securities regulation in Europe.18
This Article will initially discuss the history and causes of the subprime
mortgage crisis and then discuss the particular difficulties with the secondary
housing market and mortgage-backed securities. This Article will then
compare the different methods of securitization in several countries and
illustrate how these methods may improve the functioning of the U.S.’s
secondary mortgage market today.19
Next, this Article will review several countries’ regulatory structures with
respect to securities and bank regulations, and analyze the issues that have
been addressed by U.S. and European legislators since the crisis. More
specifically, this section will analyze the obstacles to financial stability
that exist in global markets today.
Finally, this Article will propose potential solutions to identified regulatory
shortcomings in order to enhance and thereby preserve a vital part of the
global economy and housing market. A key conclusion of this Article is that
a global perspective is essential when developing a response to a future
financial crisis due to the interconnectedness of the global economy.
Regulatory effects, domestic or global, will impact the world economy.
Future regulatory reforms must have the clear objective of reducing the
risks and consequences of future systemic financial crises, such that overall
economic growth is not adversely impacted. This Article urges policy makers
to focus on the financial system as a whole when developing legislation
intended to mitigate undue risk exposure. While policy makers have recognized
the need for this broad approach to securities regulation, the United States’
legislation post-crisis has failed to account for the interconnectedness of
international economies. While economic systems necessarily differ according
to specific needs and political imparities, the growth of technology and
globalization in the twentieth century has created a worldwide interconnected
and interdependent “system of systems.” Coupled with this Article’s proposed
16. See Yener Altunbas et al., Securitisation and the Banking Lending Channel 9–
12 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 838, 2007), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
scpwps/ecbwp838.pdf?1cf0a2a48e2127542110481651a395f8 [http://perma.cc/2M2Y-E499].
17. See id. at 10.
18. See id.
19. While this Article will comparatively examine each country’s method of securitization,
certain intricacies of individual complex financial instruments are beyond the scope of the
Article and will not receive an in-depth analysis herein. However, they are taken into
consideration in this Article’s ultimate proposal.
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broad approach, the latest financial crisis is a very useful exemplar, which
policy makers can use to address issues that remain pertinent to global
financial markets in order to avoid future crises.
I. WHAT WERE THE CAUSES OF THE U.S. SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS?
The issuing and trading of risky residential mortgage-backed securities
led to the subprime mortgage crisis.20 Mortgage-backed securities, specifically
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), are bonds secured by a pool
of home and other real estate loans.21 This form of securitization began
in the U.S. in 1968 when banks started pooling together large volumes of
newly originated mortgages and selling them to certain investment market
participants, particularly government-sponsored enterprises and private
firms.22 Mortgage-backed securities held and issued by government-sponsored
enterprises carried a government-backed guarantee on the securities’ interest
and principal payments.23 Unlike privately-held mortgage-backed securities,
the underlying loans in these mortgage-backed securities originated with
credit-worthy homeowners.24 However, the complexity of mortgage-backed
securities and difficulty of accurately assessing the risk of large pools of
mortgages led to the high ratings of privately-held mortgage-backed securities,
thereby misleading investors.25 Mortgage-backed securities issued by the
government-sponsored enterprises are not rated because they are supported
by a federal government guarantee.26 Thus, credit rating agencies did not play

20. See Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html
[http://perma.cc/8245-6NND].
21. Mortgage-Backed Securities, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/mortgagebacked-securities [https://perma.cc/2U9S-UMN8]. See Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS),
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mbs.asp [http://perma.cc/C8XJ-8VC8],
for a further explanation of a mortgage-backed security.
22. See John J. McConnell & Stephen A. Buser, The Origins and Evolution of the
Market for Mortgage-Backed Securities, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 173, 176–79 (2011).
23. Id.
24. See Wayne Passmore & Roger Sparks, Putting the Squeeze on a Market for
Lemons: Government-Sponsored Mortgage Securitization, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON.
27, 27 (1996).
25. McConnell & Buser, supra note 22, at 182.
26. Id. at 183.
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a role in the issuance of mortgage-backed securities until the late 1990s
and early 2000s when the volume of private label securities expanded.27
A. Mortgage-Backed Securitization and Its Pre-Crisis History
The “traditional” method of securitization, specifically asset-backed
securitization, structures debt securities in tranches, where loans are pooled
together and then divided based on maturity and risk.28 Leading up to the
crisis, issuers pooled together subprime mortgage loans (i.e. high-risk loans)
with high quality loans to offer investors attractive, high-yield mortgagebacked securities with high ratings that masked underlying risk exposures.29
Credit rating agencies helped private issuers package their mortgage-backed
securities so that issuers could achieve high ratings for lesser quality, higherinterest securities.30 Investors all over the world relied on these ratings and
sought mortgage-backed securities because they were highly rated and offered
substantial returns.31
The mortgage-backed security is the best method for banks to dispose
of the risks associated with lending.32 Once the mortgages are packaged
and issued into the secondary market,33 the entirety of the risk is externalized
to investors.34 Coupled with the high ratings that masked the risks transferred
to investors, this led to a demand for more mortgages to create new securities,35
and lenders began offering home loans to just about anyone, regardless of
27. Id.
28. See What is a Tranche?, FIN. WEB, https://www.finweb.com/loans/what-is-atranche.html [https://perma.cc/WY6D-SWHK], for a detailed explanation on how mortgagebacked securities are divided into tranches.
29. See Jeff Brown, Why Investors Own Private Mortgage-Backed Securities, U.S.
NEWS (July 18, 2016, 9:59 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2016-0718/why-investors-own-private-mortgage-backed-securities [https://perma.cc/8QCQ-T9EZ].
30. McConnell & Buser, supra note 22, at 182.
31. See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 849–50; see also Brown, supra note 29 (noting
that trillions of dollars’ worth of mortgage-backed securities were issued leading up to the
crisis because they were so appealing to investors).
32. Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access
to Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit and the Subcomm.
on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 118 (2003) (prepared
statement of Cameron L. Cowan, Partner, Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, LLP) (“[L]enders
had the option to move any interest rate risk associated with mortgages off of their balance
sheet.”).
33. The Nasdaq defines the secondary market as the market in which securities are
traded after they are initially offered in the primary market. Secondary Market, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/s/secondary-market (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
34. See FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, supra note 15.
35. Carl Levin, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks,
HILL (Apr. 27, 2010, 3:19 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/campaign/94549wall-street-and-the-financial-crisis-the-role-of-investment-banks-sen-carl-levin [https://perma.cc/
ZU2T-KLFS].
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their credit history, because lenders were able to sell subprime loans before
they went bad.36
Consequently, in the years leading up to the crisis, housing prices had
risen sharply—nearly doubling between 1996 and 2006.37 However, the
spike constituted a “housing bubble,” which would inevitably burst.38 In
2006, when housing prices dropped significantly and millions of mortgages
defaulted, the bubble burst.39 The risky lending practices, permissible under
the U.S.’s loose regulatory scheme at the time, provided an artificial incentive
for people to enter the housing market who otherwise could not afford to
do so.40 The increase in housing prices did not actually represent a genuine
increase in consumer demand, and the high demand for mortgage-backed
securities was not based on a reasonable valuation.41 When housing prices
dropped excessively, it was virtually impossible to ascertain the value of
the various tranches of mortgage-backed securities because the underlying
mortgages did not reflect the actual current market values of mortgagebacked securities.42
B. Effects of the Crisis
The burst of the housing bubble resulted in the global financial crisis
and the financial turmoil experienced around the world.43 The institutional
and individual investors that purchased and traded mortgage-backed securities

36. See Floyd Norris, Banks Again Avoid Having Any Skin in the Game, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/business/banks-again-avoid-havingany-skin-in-the-game.html [https://perma.cc/5283-9SAU].
37. Kathryn J. Byun, The U.S. Housing Bubble and Bust: Impacts on Employment,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 7, (Dec. 2010), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/12/art1full.pdf [https://
perma.cc/H3ZB-BUVQ].
38. Bubble, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bubble.asp [https://
perma.cc/L9NN-LY2U].
39. Id.
40. See Edward J. Schoen, The 2007–2009 Financial Crisis: An Erosion of Ethics:
A Case Study, 146 J. BUS. ETHICS 805, 811 (2017).
41. See Kimberly Amadeo, Asset Bubble, With Examples, Its Causes, and How to
Protect Yourself, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/asset-bubble-causes-examplesand-how-to-protect-yourself-3305908 [https://perma.cc/5S78-DMQ9], for a descriptive
illustration of the causes of the housing bubble.
42. See id.
43. See Stijn Claessens et al., Introduction, in FINANCIAL CRISES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES
AND POLICY RESPONSES xiii, xx (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2014).
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were not the only ones who suffered.44 Many individuals lost their homes
and declared bankruptcy as a result of the crisis.45 Many individuals also
faced unemployment; deflated consumer confidence and the associated
reduced consumption caused profits to plummet and firms to lay people
off.46 Unemployment rose sharply in the U.S. and Europe after the crisis.47
Issuers of credit default swaps, financial instruments that acted as insurance
against potential defaults of the underlying mortgages, also suffered.48
For example, American Insurance Group (AIG) issued billions of dollars’
worth of credit default swaps, including $400 billion to Lehman Brothers,
and needed a federal reserve bailout when the mortgage default rates spiked
harshly at the onset of the crisis and the insurer lacked sufficient funds to
clear the debt.49
Many other large financial institutions were in desperate need of assistance
following the deterioration of mortgage-backed securities.50 Merrill Lynch
merged with Bank of America to avoid bankruptcy.51 Bear Stearns merged
with JP Morgan for the same reason.52 Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.53
Many of the largest banks that were integral to global economic support were
heavily invested in mortgage bonds.54 When default rates began to increase,
the crisis became inevitable, imminent, and catastrophic.55 Regulators were

44. See Viktoria Ney, Many Americans Ended Up Homeless During the Real Estate
Crisis 10 Years Ago—Here’s Where They Are Now, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:43
AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-where-those-who-lost-homes-during-the-ushousing-crisis-are-now-2018-8 [https://perma.cc/DK29-8XQL].
45. Id.
46. See Mary Hall, Unemployment & Recession – What’s the Relation?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032515/why-does-unemployment-tend-riseduring-recession.asp [https://perma.cc/4XMW-LMRU].
47. Jens Manuel Krogstad & Antonio Flores, After Nearly a Decade, the EU’s
Unemployment Rate Is Returning to Pre-Recession Levels, WORLD ECON. F. (July 23, 2018),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/eu-unemployment-rate-falls-to-near-pre-recessionlow [https://perma.cc/5R6D-ZJ35].
48. Before the crisis, the value of credit default swaps was roughly $45 trillion. In
2010, the value was nearly $20 trillion lower. Credit Default Swap, CORP. FIN. INST., https://
corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/credit-default-swap-cds/ [https://
perma.cc/F44K-CJU9].
49. Id.
50. See Nick Mathiason, Three Weeks That Changed the World, GUARDIAN (Dec.
27, 2008, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/dec/28/markets-creditcrunch-banking-2008 [https://perma.cc/9P9G-XBC6].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Levin, supra note 35.
55. See id.
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unable to prevent the crisis and attempted to mitigate the crisis by bailing
out big banks and orchestrating mergers.56
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2008, the U.S.
and Europe incurred around $267 billion in losses attributable to the subprime
mortgage crisis.57 The IMF estimated that the U.S. and Europe would sustain
another $92 billion worth of subprime-related losses following 2008.58
Resulting legislation59 has many shortcomings, and experts have continued
to express concerns over the potential harm a future crisis would cause.60
Professor David Skeel, who has written extensively on the financial crisis,
stated, “The longer we go without firm controls in place, the more dangerous
it is.”61 Ten years later, it still remains an issue whether the damage done
to financial systems and economies can be overcome.62 To avoid such crises
in the future, U.S. legislators should look at the causes of the global financial
crises as well as the ways in which other countries have avoided such. More
specifically, European countries have implemented alternative methods of
securitization that may be useful for the U.S. to consider in designing its
regulatory scheme to address the persistent transparency, incentive, and
externality issues that still exist today.
II. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF SECURITIZATION
European countries such as Germany have implemented various forms
of “synthetic” securitization to combine the advantages of credit derivatives
and conventional asset-backed securities.63 Synthetic securitization is defined
by Article 242 (11) of the Capital Requirement Regulation as a form of
securitization where “the transfer of risk is achieved by the use of credit
56.
57.

See Mathiason, supra note 50.
INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING
SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 52 (2008).
58. Id.
59. See infra Section III.A.
60. See Ben Hallman, Four Years Since Lehman Brothers, ‘Too Big to Fail’ Banks, Now
Even Bigger, Fight Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2012, 9:29 AM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/15/lehman-brothers-collapse_n_1885489.html [https://perma.cc/
QP6J-47KW].
61. Id.
62. A Decade After the Great Recession, Is the Global Financial System Safer?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 11, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/tenyears-great-recession-global-financial-system-safer/ [https://perma.cc/2X65-T64L].
63. MARTIN BÖHRINGER ET AL., CONVENTIONAL VERSUS SYNTHETIC SECURITISATION—
TRENDS IN THE GERMAN ABS MARKET 1 (Deloitte & Touche Germany eds., 2001).
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derivatives or guarantees, and the exposures being securitized remain
exposures of the originator institution.”64 In other words, synthetic securitization
transfers the credit risk of securitized assets without transferring the
ownership of them.65
The transfer occurs through a transaction where a guarantor and an originator
enter into an agreement, known as a credit protection agreement.66 The
guarantor assumes the risk of the underlying assets without owning the actual
securitized assets and makes money by insuring the risk of loss. This process
is unlike traditional securitization, where the underlying exposures are
transferred off the originator’s balance sheet and investors receive the money
that the asset generates.67 The assets underlying the synthetic security remain
on the originator’s balance sheet, along with the assets’ underlying exposures,
such as a mortgage’s default risk.68 Guarantors contractually agree to insure
the losses suffered by the owner of the underlying assets, up to a pre-agreed
maximum amount, if a credit event occurs in relation to those assets.69 Credit
events are “those events that trigger credit protection payments from
the [guarantor] to the [originator] within a credit protection contract.”70 For
insuring the potential losses, guarantors receive a premium based on
the perceived probability of credit events occurring.71
Synthetic securitization is still very similar to traditional securitization
in regard to the nature of the underlying assets and the way risks and returns
are separated in tranches.72 They mainly differ in the way they transfer
risk from originator to investor. Traditional securitization involves the effective
legal transfer of the assets to the issuer of the securities and the underlying
assets are removed from the originator’s balance sheet.73 The investor in
traditional securitization becomes entitled to the cash flows that are generated
by those underlying assets, whereas the investor in synthetic securitization
simply receives payments for the risk the investor is assuming.74
64. A Closer Look at Synthetic Securitization, WSBI-ESBG (May 25, 2016), https://
www.wsbi-esbg.org/press/latest-news/Pages/A-closer-look-at-synthetic-securitization.aspx
[https://perma.cc/K2CZ-N66T].
65. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., THE EBA REPORT ON SYNTHETIC SECURITISATION
7 (2015).
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also A Closer Look at Synthetic Securitization, supra note 64.
68. Angelos Delivorias, European Parliament, Members’ Research Serv., Synthetic
Securitization: A Closer Look, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 583.848 (June 22, 2016), http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/583848/EPRS_BRI(2016)583848_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R6L3-8P68].
69. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id.
73. Delivorias, supra note 68.
74. Id.
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A. The History of Synthetic Securitization in Europe
European banks have implemented synthetic securitization to increase
regulatory capital, account for varying costs of capital, increase investor
demand, respond to regulatory shortfalls, and address the inability to transfer
assets.75 The issuance of synthetic securitization in Europe peaked during
2004-2005, with over € 180 billion ($220 billion) of volume, reflecting
the transition between Basel I and Basel II.76 After the subprime mortgage
crisis and the worldwide crash of the securitization market, European banks
altered their synthetic securitization issuances to the lower tranches “with
the aim of achieving regulatory capital relief and de-risking.”77 While the
synthetic securitization market in the U.S. came to a halt in 2007, it has recently
gained popularity again in Europe.78 Synthetic securitization’s popularity
is evident through the actions of large European institutional investors, such
as pension funds, which began bypassing the middleman brokers and making
the synthetic securitization trades themselves.79 These institutional investors
have shifted risks associated with complex securities to outside investors in
order to meet the European Commission’s stricter capital requirements.80 The
securitization market in Europe has been slow to recover from the financial
crisis and the use of synthetic securitization is an example of Europe’s attempt
to free up capital for economic growth.81
Before this recent spike in popularity, efforts to stimulate Europe’s
securitization market were sparse.82 Although European securitized assets
were affected by the financial crisis, it was primarily “guilt by association”
that affected the European markets.83 More specifically, the high-profile
75. Gordon Kerr & Marcello Bonassoli, European Synthetic Securitisation: Presentation
Slides, DBRS (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.dbrs.com/research/307861/european-syntheticsecuritisation-presentation-slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/996P-HLUS].
76. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 11; see infra p. 420 (Basel I, II).
77. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 11.
78. Id. at 15; Daniel N. Budofsky, A Resurgence of Synthetic Securitizations, PILLSBURY
(June 20, 2017), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/a-resurgence-ofsynthetic-securitizations.html [https://perma.cc/2PNC-VHKW].
79. Julie Segal, In Search for Yield, Asset Owners Take on Bank Risks, INSTITUTIONAL
INV. (June 2, 2017), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1505pyc27yrjr/insearch-for-yield-asset-owners-take-on-bank-risks [https://perma.cc/J6AD-6LMJ].
80. Id.
81. Budofsky, supra note 78.
82. See Europe’s Securitisation Market Remains Stunted, ECONOMIST (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/02/23/europes-securitisationmarket-remains-stunted [https://perma.cc/RRW8-3NZH].
83. Id.
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defaults in the U.S. during the crisis have shaped a negative perception
overseas towards securitization and its associated risks.84 The demand for
insuring losses on certain securitized assets, especially mortgages, was
significantly less as a result.85 In Europe, however, the credit quality of
the synthetically securitized assets did not deteriorate as it did in the U.S.86
The European Union’s (EU) securitization market was more robust than its
U.S. counterpart’s securitization market during the crisis, and its defaults
were significantly lower.87 The revitalization of the popularity of synthetic
securitization in Europe comes after years of attempts at revival by European
regulators since the crisis.88 For example, the European Central Bank (ECB)
attempted to illustrate securitization’s ability to spread risks in 2013.89 The
ECB, together with the Bank of England, published a rare joint in 2014
arguing for a “better-functioning [securitization] market in the EU.”90
B. The German Pfandbrief
An example of synthetic securitization is the German Pfandbrief.91 As
a critical part of Germany’s real estate financing market, Pfandbriefs have
been issued by German banks for over two centuries in order to fund its
mortgage lending.92 Pfandbriefs are regulated by BaFin. BaFin is a regulatory
agency that supervises German business and transactions.93 BaFin oversees
German securities, banking, and insurance and ensures the German financial
system’s stability and integrity.94 BaFin periodically reports on the state
of the assets securing the mortgage bonds and oversees the banks issuing
Pfandbriefs.95 BaFin requires that the loan to value ratio of all German

84. Orçun Kaya, Synthetic Securitisation: Making a Silent Comeback, DEUTSCHE
BANK RES. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/RPS_ENPROD/PROD0000000
000441788/Synthetic_securitisation%3A_Making_a_silent_comeback.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C42Z-P6ZV].
85. See Europe’s Securitisation Market Remains Stunted, supra note 82.
86. See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 18.
87. Kaya, supra note 84.
88. Europe’s Securitisation Market Remains Stunted, supra note 82.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 838.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 839.
94. See Marvin Fechner & Travis Tipton, Securities Regulation in Germany and the
U.S., COMP. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG., Spring 2016, at 1, 8.
95. BUNDESVERBAND ÖFFENTLICHER BANKEN DEUTSCHLANDS & ALLEN & OVERY,
THE NEW GERMAN PFANDBRIEF ACT: STRENGTHENING GERMANY AS A FINANCIAL CENTER
8–9 (2005), https://www.yumpu.com/de/document/read/4059490/das-neue-pfandbriefgesetzthe-new-german-pfandbrief-act [https://perma.cc/97KD-AYQN] (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
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securities be equal to the bond value.96 Several years after the global financial
crisis, the German Parliament passed the Pfandbrief Act to further protect
investors and consolidate the regulation of the Pfandbrief into one
comprehensive law.97
The Pfandbrief is an example of a security that meets investors’ needs
for security and transparency, even in times of troubled capital market phases.98
These advantageous qualities of the German Pfandbrief stem from its legal
basis.99 In July 2014, the European Banking Authority published a report
naming Germany’s legal framework the best of various European covered
bond legislations.100 Like the U.S., there has been a continued positive
development of commercial real estate markets, which led to the increase
in issuances of Pfandbriefs from 2010 to 2017.101
The German Pfandbrief Act exemplifies a successful regulatory framework
for countries all over the world to follow in order to avoid future crises.
The Association of German Pfandbrief Banks has referred to its country’s
most successful form of synthetic securitization as follows:
Quality by Tradition: even in troubled times, the Pfandbrief is an especially sound
investment. Its first-class quality and stable returns on investment are valued by
investors in Germany and abroad and, thanks in particular to the stringent German
Pfandbrief Act, it will remain the benchmark in the covered bond market.102

This excerpt identifies the most important attribute of the German Pfandbrief
—its ability to endure financial turmoil.
The German legislature has primarily focused on the risk inherent in
credit institutions and has defined specific risk management requirements
for Pfandbrief banks.103 This is especially important in addressing the causes

96. Id.
97. See Pfandbriefgesetz [PfandBG] [Pfandbrief Act], May 22, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT,
TEIL I [BGBL. I] at 1373, last amended by Gesetz [G], Mar. 20, 2009, BGBL. I at 607,
§ 30 (Ger.), translated in The Pfandbrief Act, Verband Deutscher Pfandbriefbanken [Ass’n of
German Pfandbrief Banks], https://www.pfandbrief.de/site/dam/jcr:38daf12b-9478-4ba3adde-dfd0b4cfaf05/EN_PfandBG_01_2019_.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8TF-FMAX].
98. DG HYP, THE GERMAN PFANDBRIEF MARKET 2015 | 2016 2 (2015), https://www.
dzhyp.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/Ueber_uns/Marktberichte/2015_DG_HYP_
The_German_Pfandbriefmarket.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4E5-VG79].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Verband Deutscher Pfandbriefbanken, The Pfandbrief Roundtable 2015, COVERED
BOND REP., Sept. 2015, at 1, 12.
103. DG HYP, supra note 98, at 18.
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of the financial crisis because one significant cause was the excessive risktaking by large financial institutions.104 There are a number of requirements
that German Pfandbrief banks must satisfy with respect to default risks,
interest and exchange-rate risks, and operational and liquidity risks.105
Similar to recent U.S. bank regulation, German Pfandbrief banks must also
satisfy minimum capital and general cover requirements to withstand stress
tests.106 The large U.S. banks that crashed in the midst of the global financial
crisis would have failed stress tests long before the crisis happened.107 The
inability of U.S. banks to withstand such stress tests was previously
inconceivable by regulators until the inevitable failures actually took place.108
The German Pfandbrief Act is structured to avoid that exact situation from
happening in the future.109
In contrast to U.S. creditors, Pfandbrief creditors can rightfully put their
faith in the due diligence of the refinancing institutions because of the rigorous
rules set forth by the German legislature.110 Pfandbriefs lack complexity
relative to many U.S. securities and have sufficient monitoring by the German
BaFin.111 The complexity of synthetic securities backed by syndicated mortgage
loans112 is also simplified by the German Pfandbrief Act.113 Syndicated loans
are extremely complex as they exist across the globe, making it difficult for
credit rating agencies to rate them.114
The German Pfandbrief Act also differs from U.S. securities regulations
in that the Act does not have any rating rules for public sector debtors.115 The
United States’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented strict
rating rules following the financial crisis and pinpointed credit agencies
to attempt to fix the insurmountable credit default risks.116 The member
institutions of German Pfandbrief banks account for credit quality in the
evaluation of the security’s underlying assets, which is outside the bounds

104.
105.
106.
107.

See Schoen, supra note 40, at 816.
DG HYP, supra note 98, at 18.
See id. at 17–18.
See Mark Gongloff, Stress Tests: Citigroup, Three Other Major Banks Fail,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:58 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/
13/stress-tests-citibank_n_1342928.html [https://perma.cc/7UZZ-3DCW].
108. See id.
109. DG HYP, supra note 98, at 33.
110. See id. at 25.
111. Id.
112. A syndicated loan is a loan offered by a group of lenders that work together to
provide funds for a single borrower. Syndicated Loan Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/s/syndicatedloan.asp [https://perma.cc/R85M-YUBR].
113. See id.
114. For a detailed description of syndicated loans, see id.
115. See DG HYP, supra note 98, at 27.
116. See infra Section III.A.
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of necessity in the regulation of Pfandbriefs.117 The U.S.’s focus on credit
rating agencies is effective to an extent, but it mitigates the valuable incentives
for institutional investors to increase the value of their assets and loans.118
For example, German Pfandbrief banks are inherently incentivized to issue
mortgage-backed loans with higher credit to achieve higher value under
Germany’s synthetic securitization practices.119
Rating agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s and S&P play a role in the
investment decision-making process of Pfandbrief investors, just like they
do for any other investor in global markets.120 However, their importance
and influence on risk premiums, if any, has declined in the last few years.121
Instead, investors have to rely on other aspects like the due diligence of
refinancing institutions.122 Nevertheless, in June 2015, Moody’s assessed
German Pfandbriefs at higher ratings than they were before.123 In 2016,
seventy-five percent of Pfandbriefs were assigned Moody’s top rating (Aaa).124
S&P also had a very positive assessment of Pfandbriefs following its evaluation
of the Pfandbrief legal framework.125
Germany’s synthetic securitization in the form of mortgage Pfandbriefs
have strict requirements under the Pfandbrief Act so that they exhibit
transparency and further investor incentives without inhibiting growth.126
Similar to the U.S.’s regulatory framework, the Pfandbrief Act imposes loanto-value requirements on mortgage loans.127 However, mortgage Pfandbriefs
must satisfy additional criteria to ensure sound practices, which results in
less necessary oversight by agencies under BaFin.128 Under the Act, only
mortgages on certain types of property are permitted and the underlying
properties must be insured.129 Furthermore, the loan-to-value requirement
is extended to require regular testing and overall reevaluations when sharp
117. See DG HYP, supra note 98, at 21.
118. Luis A. Aguilar, Public Statement, Restoring Integrity to the Credit Rating Process,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/2014-08-27-open-meeting-statement-nrsro-laa [https://perma.cc/33EK-S5VG].
119. See DG HYP, supra note 98, at 2.
120. Id. at 12.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id. at 13.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 14.
126. See id. at 16–30.
127. Id. at 27.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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decreases in prices occur.130 More specifically, when lending values for
properties fall in certain regions, the lending values in those regions are
reviewed and adjusted if necessary.131
C. The Future of Synthetic Securitization in Europe
In December 2015, the European Banking Authority issued a report on
synthetic securitization that described the underlying risk exposures associated
with loans remaining in the hands of originators and on their balance sheets.132
The report suggested that banks can securitize by acquiring the insurance
they need while keeping the loans they generated.133
This means that risks are realized through the risk transfer by means of
credit protection, resulting in a genuine tradeoff between efficiency and
stability.134 The best ways to improve financial stability are exemplified through
both this tradeoff and through the inherent improvement of incentives in
the synthetic securities market, which is realized in synthetic securities such
as the Pfandbrief.135 S&P’s performance data on lifetime defaults for different
methods of securitization shows that synthetic securitization has outperformed
traditional securitization in multiple German market indices.136
A fundamental misalignment of financial incentives played a large part
in the subprime mortgage crisis.137 The U.S.’s traditional securitization allowed
the originators, as well as the financial institutions that repackaged the
mortgage-backed securities, to avoid internalizing risks associated with
the underlying mortgages.138 Thus, there was little incentive to properly
monitor the creditworthiness of individual borrowers and mortgage-backed
securities.139
Synthetic securitization provides a model for U.S. securitization to address
this incentive issue.140 Originators externalize the risk to investors that are
willing to take them on.141 Therefore, investors are incentivized to understand
the underlying mortgage risks because they are essentially assuming the
role of an insurance agent to the mortgage originators.142
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
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Id. at 28.
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Id. at 22.
See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 8.
See id. at 7.
EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., supra note 65, at 18.
See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 834.
Id.
Id.
See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 7.
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See id. at 835.
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Synthetic securitization is also prevalent in other parts of world,
including Italy and parts of Asia.143 Risk realization and the allocation of
incentives are just two of the several strengths demonstrated by synthetic
securitization.144 In Italy, traditional securitization is the more common
practice, but synthetic securitization has become increasingly popular in
the last few years.145 European banks, such as Italy’s Banca di Credito Popolare,
have implemented this method to manage credit risk and improve their
capital ratios.146 The European Commission has named synthetic securitization
as one of the main objectives in its Capital Markets Union project.147
Germany’s use of traditional securitization had been minimal, in comparison
to its synthetic securitization practices, until about 2005, when German
securities regulation began to better accommodate risk takers.148 When
traditional securitization increased in Germany, it became a valuable complement
to the Pfandbriefs by appealing to the increased appetite for “risk-andreturn” investors while maintaining a strong market for “risk-averse”
investors.149 However, the crisis halted traditional securitization in both
the U.S. and Germany.150 In the midst of the crisis, U.S. regulators clamped
down on traditional securitization, opening the door for synthetic securitization
in the country.151 Overall, lending and investing has been altered in many
market environments due to a global consensus for increased transparency.152
This Article will examine this international consensus and compare legislation
in several different countries, including the U.S. and Germany. Ultimately,
the goal of legislation should be to balance incentives for growth in the
securitization market.

143.
144.
145.

Id. at 842–43.
Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 11.
See Owen Sanderson, EIF Securitizations Funnel Structural Funds to SMEs,
GLOBALCAPITAL.COM (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.globalcapital.com/article/b16n58kzptd526/
eif-securitizations-funnel-structural-funds-to-smes [https://perma.cc/KZL5-ZET6].
146. See id.
147. A Closer Look at Synthetic Securitization, supra note 64.
148. See Rusznak, supra note 5, at 841.
149. See id.
150. See Sumit Agarwal et al., The Asset-Backed Securities Markets, the Crisis, and
TALF, FED. RES. BANK CHI. 101 (2010).
151. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
and Office of Financial Research 2016 Financial Stability Conference: Financial Regulation
Since the Crisis (Dec. 2, 2016).
152. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the PLI 49th Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation: Governance and Transparency at the Commission and in our Markets
(Nov. 8, 2017).
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III. CURRENT STATE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
Recent reforms across the globe have focused on improving the internal
finances of financial institutions by implementing liquidity standards and
capital requirements on all global systemically important financial
institutions (G-SIFI’s).153 These aims are critical in addressing the factors
that led to the insolvency of some of the world’s largest banks.154 Had
these requirements been in place in 2006, the global financial crisis may
never have happened, or at the very least, its effects would have been mitigated.
The following sections discuss these various approaches by U.S. and European
regulators and the effects of their intended and realized outcomes.
A. U.S. Legislation in Response to the Crisis
Toward the outset of the crisis in 2009, U.S. regulators and central bank
experts began officially meeting as the Financial Stability Board to coordinate
future regulatory plans for U.S. financial institutions and set international
banking standards.155 Although regulators have faced challenges in ascertaining
effective tools for securities reforms, the task is not impossible.156 Legislation
focused primarily on the internal financial statements of institutional investors,
however, has neglected to implement the effective, necessary tools for
avoiding future crises.157
The increase in “banking supervision” in the U.S. has prevented banks
from taking excessive risks, such as lending to individuals lacking
creditworthiness.158 This is a reaction to the deficient underwriting standards
leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis.159 The underwriting standards
led to a significant increase in the average loan to value of home mortgages
between 2001 and 2006, as well as an extreme acceleration of loans involving

153. Wayne Passmore & Alexander H. von Hafften, Are Basel’s Capital Surcharges
for Global Systemically Important Banks Too Small?, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV (Feb. 27,
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2017/are-basels-capitalsurcharges-for-global-systemically-important-banks-too-small-20170223.html [https://perma.cc/
NZ9L-SAJZ].
154. Id.
155. Policy Development and Coordination, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.fsb.org/
what-we-do/policy-development/ [https://perma.cc/EP66-CRXC].
156. See id.
157. See Claessens & Kodres, supra note 10, at 4.
158. See Sabine Lautenschläger, Vice-Chair, Supervisory Bd. of the ECB, Speech at
the Institute of International and European Affairs: Walled Off? Banking Regulation After
the Crisis (Mar. 13, 2017).
159. Id.
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100 percent financing.160 Consequently, U.S. legislators have focused much
of their attention on underwriting standards.161
In response to increased mortgage defaults, Congress targeted the mortgage
originators and enacted the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act to help ensure that loans were not being made in excess of the value
of the property.162 Congress properly recognized that mortgage originators
are part of the transparency problem, but failed to address the needs of
investors and the lack of tools necessary to help investors make betterinformed decisions about the future.163 Similarly, the SEC targeted creditors,
ignoring some financial tools that already exist that could potentially increase
transparency for investors.164
Addressing systemic risks has been the basis for much of the more recent
financial policies.165 This is a step in the right direction that will address
many of the prominent issues that exist outside financial statements. The
subprime mortgage crisis shed light on institutional infrastructure flaws
and the interconnectedness of international markets.166 However, Congress
has continued to focus on protecting the millions of defaulted homeowners
instead of focusing on systemic risks and more macro-prudential policies.167
The fragmentation that exists in American banking today is an important
aspect to note in the systemic risks that still exist.168

160. Between 2001 and 2006 the average loan to value on home mortgages rose nearly
10 % and the share of mortgage loans that involved 100 percent financing rose about 30%.
Presentation of Why We Are Still in the Early Innings of the Bursting of the Housing and
Credit Bubbles – And the Implications for MBIA and Ambac, T2 PARTNERS LLC 4 (May
7, 2008), https://files.meetup.com/81427/T2_presentation_mortgagesbond_insurers.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FLG5-EZUZ].
161. See Peter J. Wallison, Underwriting the Next Housing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/opinion/underwriting-the-next-housingcrisis.html [https://perma.cc/7TYX-J8C9].
162. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).
163. DARRELL DUFFIE, EUR. CENT. BANK, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM AFTER
THE CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT 41 (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publicationpdf/rp3440_financial_regulatory_reform_after_the_crisis.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZU3-S4R3].
164. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce: SEC Reform After Dodd-Frank and the Financial Crisis (Dec. 14, 2011).
165. See Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Fed. Res., Speech at the American Economic
Association/American Finance Association Joint Luncheon: Interconnectedness and Systemic
Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and Policy Implications (Jan. 4, 2013).
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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B. Comparison of Current Regulatory Structures in the
U.S. and Europe
Mortgage-backed securitization has exposed the weaknesses of the
fragmented regulatory structure within the U.S.169 The U.S. separates its
financial regulatory structure by delegating certain regulatory responsibilities
to different agencies that have overlapping authorities.170 Consolidating
the regulation of banking and securities may be appropriate, especially given
the success of the British FSA, the German BaFin, and similar consolidated
agencies in Europe.171 Securities markets have become increasingly
interconnected, and the U.S’s fragmentation of these markets has created
regulatory challenges.172 Since the crisis, different agencies have been
inconsistent in regulating entities that engage in similar activities.173 In
its June 2009 proposal, the Obama administration attempted to address the
fragmentation issue by proposing to consolidate two government agencies,
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC).174 However, because this still leaves federal regulation
of state banks with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and
the Federal Reserve, securities and banking regulation remain separate in
the U.S.175 Germany’s establishment of the BaFin federally preempted
national banking and furthered oversight of banking functions.176
Similarly, the EU has little to say about regulatory issues within European
countries and does not divide authority within different countries.177 The
extent of the EU’s authority over banking regulation is limited to crossborder banking.178 Conversely, the U.S. delegates important and systematic
169. See id.
170. Financial Regulation: Complex and Fragmented Structure Could Be Streamlined
to Improve Effectiveness, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Feb. 25, 2016), https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-175 [https://perma.cc/N8M7-G4S4].
171. See Sabrina R. Pellerin et al., The Consolidation of Financial Market Regulation:
Pros, Cons, and Implications for the United States 41–46 (Fed. Res. Bank. Richmond,
Working Paper No. 8, 2009), https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/
research/working_papers/2009/pdf/wp09-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/99LG-XL2P].
172. See Yellen, supra note 165.
173. See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 29.
174. ELIZABETH F. BROWN, VOLCKER ALLIANCE, PRIOR PROPOSALS TO CONSOLIDATE
FEDERAL FINANCING REGULATORS 172, https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/
attachments/Background%20Paper%201_Prior%20Proposals%20to%20Consolidate%20
Federal%20Financial%20Regulators.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9ER-HUU2].
175. See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 14.
176. Id. at 45.
177. See id. at 42.
178. Lorenz Emter et al., Cross-Border Banking in the EU Since the Crisis:
What is Driving the Great Retrenchment? 3–4 (European Central Bank, Working Paper
No. 2130, 2018), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2130.en.pdf?78e19edfa90
c63da12986751621a6340 [https://perma.cc/T8MU-2ZD4].
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issues to the federal level.179 European fragmentation exists at the EU level,
although there have been efforts to increase EU member states’ banking
regulation.180 Nevertheless, countries within the EU, such as Germany,
have a more centralized regulatory environment that inherently applies control
when necessary.181
C. International Securities Reforms Post-Crisis
In September 2015, the European Commission generated a legislative
proposal package with two related securitization proposals.182 The first
proposed a regulation adopting common rules for securitization and creating
a European framework for simple, transparent and comparable (“STC”)
securitizations.183 In this proposal, the European Commission permits
“true sale” securitizations to qualify as STC securitizations, but not synthetic
transactions.184 The proposal has two components: (1) a regulation on
securitization that would require due diligence, risk retention, and transparency
with a set of criteria to identify STC securitizations; and (2) an amendment
to the rules relating to the capital treatment of securitizations for banks
and investment firms.185
At the time of this first proposal, the international standard-setters, such
as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, and the European Banking
Association (“EBA”), had not yet developed STC criteria for synthetic
securitization.186 There was also no consensus on the specifics of these
organizations’ inclusions in the STC framework, and no clarity as to which
synthetic securities should be considered STC securities and under which
conditions.187 However, the European Commission left open the possibility
that some synthetic securities would qualify as STC securities if they
performed well during the financial crisis and can be characterized as

179.
180.

See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 4.
See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, BANKING STRUCTURES IN THE NEW EU MEMBER
STATES 28–29 (2005).
181. See Pellerin et al., supra note 171, at 41–43.
182. Delivorias, supra note 68.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Segal, supra note 79.
186. Delivorias, supra note 68.
187. Id.
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simple, transparent and standardized securities.188 The second proposal is
similar to the Basel Committee’s in that it deals with banks’ capital
requirements.189
The BCBS has responded to the financial crisis with an agenda known
as Basel III.190 The BCBS previously established standardized approaches
for assessing risks associated with bank securities, known as Basel I and
Basel II.191 The BCBS created Basel III in an effort to address the causes
of the global financial crisis as they relate to the “supervision and risk
management of the banking sector.”192
Critics of Basel III claim the Basel Committee regulations discriminate
against synthetic securitization.193 The critics of the Basel regulatory framework
believe the structure of the legislation is discriminatory because it favors
traditional securitization.194 Critics suggest that the risk weight in synthetic
securitization should be calculated in a more favorable way than the Basel
regulations impose.195 The top tranches of a synthetic securitization structure
are often guaranteed by a bank, thereby placing a repayment obligation in
the company that borrowed the money, as well as the guarantor bank.196
Basel only takes into account the guarantor’s credit rating and does not
account for additional factors in its calculation of risks.197
Consequently, the BSBC revisited its financial agenda and revised its
securitization framework, which it published in December 2014.198 The
BSBC’s revision came into effect in January 2018 as part of its broader
Basel III.199 This follows the joint review of international securitization
markets by BSBC and the International Organization of Securities

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Matt Schlickenmaier, Basel III and Credit Risk Measurement: Variations Among
G20 Countries, 14 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 193, 194 (2012).
191. Id. at 196.
192. Id. at 210.
193. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA’S COMMENT PAPER ON THE NEW BASEL
ACCORD 105 (2001), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ca/isdaresp.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM87B9HL].
194. Mikael Harstad, Legal Risks of Conventional and Synthetic Securitization, UNIV.
LUND (2006), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1558151&
fileOId=1564558 [https://perma.cc/8Z2L-W88Q].
195. See Melvyn Westlake, Drive for Bigger Basel II Securitisation Changes, GLOBAL
RISK REGULATOR (Feb. 15, 2007), https://www.globalriskregulator.com/Archive/NewsletterMar-2004-Drive-for-bigger-Basel-II-securitisation-changes [https://perma.cc/SS2L-V2SY].
196. See Harstad, supra note 194.
197. Id.
198. Basel III Document: Revisions to the Securitization Framework, BASEL COMM.
BANKING SUPERVISION (rev. July 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.pdf [https://perma.
cc/2J6G-HEPH].
199. Id.

420

DILLAVOU.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 21: 399, 2019]

2/7/2020 9:07 AM

Synthetic Securitization
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

Commissions (“IOSCO”).200 In July 2015, the BSBC and the IOSCO
issued criteria to assist the financial industry’s development of simple,
transparent and comparable (STC) securitization.201 These revisions are
guided by the BSBC’s effort to strike an appropriate balance between risk
sensitivity, simplicity and comparability.202 This is the latest international
regulatory effort to consider whether, and how, STC criteria for synthetic
securitization should be developed.203 The BSBC will then determine how
to incorporate synthetic securitization in its Basel III revised securitization
framework and how the various types of exposures will be treated.204
Since the financial crisis, synthetic securitization, namely credit default
swap (CDS) trading, has declined significantly in the United States.205 An
International Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA) Quarterly Report
in 2016 disclosed that the notional outstanding volume of these instruments
had fallen by more than 75% since June 2008.206 A variety of factors have
contributed to this decline, such as (1) changes in bank capital rules, (2) the
significant decline in the synthetic CDO market, (3) uncertainty surrounding
portfolio margining, and (4) generally less demand, likely due to hedging
or speculative trading responsive to lower default rates following the
crisis.207
German banks were among the countless foreign banks that bought subprime
mortgage-backed securities without entirely knowing the risks.208 Large
and small financial institutions across the world bought these securities
because the prospective returns were relatively higher than almost every
other investment opportunity.209 Also, the international Basel requirements
encouraged these financial institutions to own mortgage-backed securities
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. For a discussion on market initiatives, see Gary Barnett, Deputy Director, SEC
Div. of Trading & Mkts., Remarks at the ISDA Annual Legal Forum in New York (June
16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/barnett-remarks-isda-annual-legal-forum2016.html [https://perma.cc/XH37-RV84].
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Frank Hornig et al., American Mortgage Crisis Rattles German Banking Sector,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (Germany) (Aug. 10, 2007, 11:18 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
business/bad-debts-american-mortgage-crisis-rattles-german-banking-sector-a-499160.html
[https://perma.cc/3BLP-E5QY].
209. See Dam, supra note 11, at 582.
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rather than loans.210 The magnitude of losses suffered outside the U.S. as
a result of the crisis demonstrates the interconnectedness of the global
financial world.211 It is now more evident than ever that financial stability
in securitization markets must be achieved through a global perspective
and macro-prudential policy.
IV. HOW CAN UNDUE RISKS BE AVOIDED, OR AT LEAST
MITIGATED, IN THE FUTURE?
Risk is, by definition, an intrinsic characteristic of any risk-reward
scenario. Risks are measures of uncertainty that investors must calculate
and are typically directly proportionate to any reward—i.e. the greater the
potential reward, the greater the risk. Substantial risks will always remain
in global markets, including risks of future crises. Although risks of
market failure have been mitigated by numerous regulatory practices following
the subprime mortgage crisis, it is likely there are approaches yet to be devised
that may further protect systems against catastrophic destabilizing.
The legislative proposal put forward by the BSBC is one example of an
approach that reduces an overreliance on banks and promotes, instead,
more reliance on simple, transparent securitization.212 On the other hand,
U.S. regulation has predominantly focused on the internal practices of large
financial institutions.213 U.S. regulators have imposed capital requirements
on commercial and investment banks to reduce the risks of insolvency.214
They also have required all commercial banks to maintain certain minimum
levels of deposit insurance from the FDIC to reduce depositors’ incentives
to demand withdrawals when liquidity issues occur.215 Liquidity issues
have been addressed by granting the Federal Reserve the authority to serve
as a “lender of last resort” for these financial institutions.216
The primary objective of U.S. regulators has been to reduce the risks
and costs of future systemic financial crises in a manner that would have

210. See John Carney, Why Banks Bought So Many Toxic Mortgage Bonds, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 7, 2009, 1:53 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-banks-bought-somany-toxic-mortgage-bonds-2009-8 [https://perma.cc/JJ78-475B].
211. DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING CORP., UNDERSTANDING INTERCONNECTEDNESS
RISKS TO BUILD A MORE RESILIENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM 12–15 (2015), http://www.dtcc.com/
news/2015/october/12/understanding-interconnectedness-risks-article [https://perma.cc/
ZVZ9-MBWD].
212. See Europe’s Securitisation Market Remains Stunted, supra note 82.
213. See JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45162, REGULATORY REFORM 10
YEARS AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION OF NON-BANK FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 9–10 (2018).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 10.
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the smallest impact on overall economic growth.217 As legislative attorney
and Congressional researcher Jay B. Sykes explains, “[h]owever, as the
2007-2009 financial crisis has arguably demonstrated, sometimes these
measures have proven insufficient to prevent financial institution failures.”218
Thus, regulation and legislation with a more system-wide view, coupled with
the present focus on internal banking systems, should be the target moving
forward.
The somewhat newfound focus on systemic risk has facilitated a shift
toward a more system-wide view. This was an implicit concern of the
Obama administration’s proposal to merge federal agencies in an attempt
to centralize the U.S. regulatory environment. However, fragmentation is
not the primary issue. The problem remains that even systemic responses
will be ineffective unless they address incentives, externalities, transparencies,
and market failures.
Germany’s legislation established a financial instrument that encourages
positive investor incentives and increases transparency through its legal
framework. The German Pfandbrief provides investors with a degree of
safety that is only offered by a select few countries across the world.219
The Pfandbrief has been cited as one of the soundest instruments during a
financial crisis like the 2008-2009 crisis.220 The EU acknowledged the success
of the Pfandbrief, and implemented Germany’s strict safety requirements
in EU regulations.221 The EU included many aspects of Germany’s legal
framework in its policy directives to investment companies (e.g., Art. 52
IV UCITS Directive), its Capital Requirement Directive, and its Preferential
Treatment of Pfandbrief within the scope of the European Central Bank’s
monetary policy operations.222 The U.S. can learn much from foreign regulatory
approaches, and implement practices such as Germany’s synthetic securitization
in the form of Pfandbriefs and other international legislation already in
place.

217. See supra Part I.
218. SYKES, supra note 213, at 10.
219. Orazio Mastroeni, Pfandbrief-style products in Europe, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS
45, 51, https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap05b.pdf [https://perma.cc/256B-EZEE].
220. Id. at 50–51.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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A. Incentives & Externalities
Prior to securitization, mortgage originators had one incentive: to loan
money to people that would pay it back, with interest. After securitization,
and during the crisis, mortgage originators and those financial institutions
responsible for packing the mortgages into securities lacked this incentive
because default risks were transferred entirely to those investors who
purchased mortgage-backed securities. Consequently, loans to risky borrowers
increased significantly. Originators did not care that they were charging high
interest rates to borrowers with bad credit because they made their money
and never incurred losses when defaults occurred. In fact, mortgage originators
had an incentive to pursue risky mortgages in order to offer higher returns
(in the form of higher interest rates) to investors.
This is the first and most important issue that U.S. policy makers should
address and incorporate into practices. This is because economists and many
policy makers believe incentives are most effective in achieving desired
financial solutions.223 Europe’s widespread use of synthetic securitization
is structured so that originators keep the mortgages on their books. Although
mortgage originators can already issue securities that act as insurance policies,
synthetic securitization restricts the externalization to the extent that risky
lending will be more transparent and less likely to occur. The risks would
be known to potential investors, who can then make an informed decision
as to whether they are acceptable given the potential return on their investment.
Thus, mortgage originators would be deterred from engaging in careless
lending practices and extreme risk taking.
B. Transparency
The risks associated with mortgage-backed securities were extremely
difficult to ascertain because credit rating agencies helped private issuers
package their securities to obtain higher credit ratings. Unlike most securities,
the critical information about mortgage-backed securities did not come from
the market. Instead, the particular rating an agency would give a mortgagebacked security was typically the primary, if not the only, information available
for investors to base their decisions on. The fact that so many of the world’s
largest banks purchased securities backed by subprime loans illustrates
the lack of transparency that existed in the secondary mortgage market.
The absence of market information on mortgage-backed securities contributed
to the extreme volumes of subprime mortgage-backed securities because
investors relied on the credit agencies’ prime ratings. Mortgage-backed
223. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., REGULATION & THE ECONOMY: THE RELATIONSHIP &
HOW TO IMPROVE IT (2017).
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securities were very appealing because they yielded high interest rates and
they were rated highly by reputable agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s,
Moody’s and Fitch. Investors were largely unaware of the significant default
risks that came along with the underlying subprime mortgages, hundreds
of thousands of which would eventually go into default. These credit rating
agencies likely had serious conflicts of interest in rating the securities that
were assigned to them.
Large institutional investors certainly should have known enough about
mortgage-backed securities to know that high interest rate loans are unlikely
to back “top-rated” securities—this is simply counterintuitive. Just like
buying high and selling low cannot be made up with volume, it is unlikely
that bundling high risk mortgage loans (i.e., high interest rates) would result
in an increased credit rating. Regardless, the lack of public information
may have violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for nondisclosure
or fraudulent disclosure of certain information.
Transparency can be increased by implementing aspects of synthetic
securitization in conjunction with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
Regulation AB, established at the beginning of 2005, as the first inclusive
set of regulations for traditional securitization.224 Regulation AB lays out
the registration, disclosure, communication and periodic reporting practices
required for asset-backed securities.225 The SEC revised certain disclosure
and reporting requirements, and implemented several key areas of reform
in response to the global financial crisis in its second edition of the
regulation (Regulation AB II) in August 2014.226 U.S. legislators can further
improve transparency by supplementing the disclosure requirements for
asset-backed securities and including aspects of synthetic securitization,
such as requiring public-style disclosure for the resale of structured finance
products and privately-held asset-backed securities.227
Increases in transparency could also be realized by tailoring regulation
to the aforementioned incentive and externality issues on a broad and
systemic basis. These increases in transparency could be achieved by
implementing the incentives in synthetic securitization: specifically, that
224. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RIN 3235-AF74, ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (2004).
225. Id.
226. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, RIN 3235-AK37, ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES DISCLOSURE
AND REGISTRATION (2014).
227. Regulation AB/Regulation AB II, CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP: STRUCTURED
FINANCIAL INSIGHTS, https://www.structuredfinanceinsights.com/resources-17.html [https://
perma.cc/X4M8-RZ7T].
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the agreement in a synthetic security transaction requires both parties to
determine the risk of default for the underlying asset and the amount the
buyer will pay for the risk of default that the seller is assuming. This way,
both parties would have an incentive to fully investigate and understand
the underlying assets as much as possible. This incentive affords more
objective information about the underlying assets. The SEC’s Regulation
AB would likely provide significantly more transparency if it was coupled
with this negotiation requirement.
The U.S.’s current regulatory framework will likely allow for complementary
criteria issued by the BSBC and the IOSCO. Furthermore, U.S. regulators
should focus on the financial industry’s development of “simple, transparent
and comparable securitizations.”228 U.S. regulators can augment their
focus on internal bank and creditor practices with a similar aim to the
BSBC’s effort to strike an appropriate balance between risk sensitivity,
simplicity, and comparability.229 However, this would require a broader,
systemic view of financial markets. The BSBC is in the process of defining
criteria for “simple, transparent and comparable securitization” for synthetic
securitization; as such, the time is now for U.S. regulators to consider the
STC framework’s applicability in the current regulatory scheme.230 U.S.
regulators have already incorporated parts of the Basel Committee’s agenda
and can likely implement aspects of these foreign synthetic securitization
practices as well.231
C. Market Failures
This Article’s proposal, although directed at U.S. reform, advocates for
a more collaborative and globally inclusive approach to the regulation of
the secondary mortgage market. Since the crisis, U.S. regulators targeted
specific banking practices, without making any significant steps toward
integrating with or including regulatory practices that have been found to
work outside the U.S. However, the interconnectedness of today’s financial
markets warrants a broader view to foresee and respond to the systemic
risks. Moreover, U.S. securities, in particular, are widespread and abundant
across the globe, and as has been seen from the crisis, these securities have
huge impacts on global economies.
Thus, an inclusive perspective is necessary in safeguarding mortgagebacked securities. U.S. regulation will better address market failures when it
is done in conjunction with international institutions, especially those in

228.
229.
230.
231.
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Europe where there is substantial economic overlap. Additionally, U.S.
regulation will likely mitigate more of the risks associated with the crisis
if it incorporates aspects of securitization methods used in Europe, especially
aspects of Germany’s Pfandbrief.
Current reform, which specifies liquidity and capital requirements for
large banks, is past due for complementary reform that focuses on systemic
risks in a manner which acknowledges more explicitly the interactions of
global markets. Moreover, the synthetic securitization methods utilized
outside the U.S. provide insight into how to overcome the structural problems
of mortgage-backed securities.
D. Globalization
The interconnectedness of individual countries’ economic systems is
demonstrated by the globalization of markets.232 Technological advances
drove the world toward a commonality convergence, which in turn triggered
the emergence of standardized global markets in the early 1980s.233
Technology enabled businesses to operate as if the world were a single
entity by transforming communication, transport, and travel.234 “Daniel
J. Boorstin, author of the monumental trilogy The Americans, characterized
our age as driven by ‘the Republic of Technology [whose] supreme law . . .
is convergence, the tendency for everything to become more like everything
else.’” 235 Today, the world is witnessing the almost instantaneous
interconnectedness of individuals and access to information enabled by
computers, phones, and applications that proliferate across societies.
Technological forces have led businesses to sell standardized products
in the same way all across the world.236 For example, agricultural commodities
and equipment, banking and insurance services, and industrial and commercial
construction have become more standardized since the midpoint of the
twenty-first century.237 Since then, the most competitive businesses are
able to offer superior quality and reliability by optimizing the best combinations

232. See Theodore Levitt, The Globalization of Markets, HARV. BUS. REV. (May
1983), https://hbr.org/1983/05/the-globalization-of-markets [https://perma.cc/A34C-E3JB].
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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of price, quality, reliability, and delivery for products that are globally
identical with respect to design, function, and even fashion.238
In the several years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, influential
voices in the political, business, and academic communities expressed growing
concern that the U.S. capital markets were losing their competitive
advantage.239 In 2008, the U.S. Department of Treasury warned about the
“real and growing” threat to U.S. competitiveness in global markets and
urged reforms “to protect the competitiveness of the U.S. public capital
markets.”240 At the end of the crisis in 2009, the interconnectedness of
global markets and the importance of a globally coordinated approach
toward securities regulation became more apparent than ever.241 With this
in mind, the Obama Administration proposed financial regulatory reforms
with the intent of strengthening international cooperation in raising international
regulatory standards.242 The bulk of these reforms focused predominately
on increased oversight of the global financial markets, and the global
financial firms in particular, whose instability caused significant damage
to the global economy.243 These reforms were introduced during a time
of increased doubts about the future of globalization.244
However, the bleak outlook for globalization following the global financial
crisis was short-lived.245 Trade and foreign direct investment, which were
hit hard during the financial crisis, have generally been positive and strong
indicators of the state of globalization since 2009.246 According to data
on international trade, capital, people and information flows, globalization
slowed in 2015 but did not go into reverse.247 In 2016, globalization remained
flat and may have even increased.248 The Obama Administration likely
influenced the continuation of globalization through its repeated calls for
238.
239.

Id.
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S.
CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORTS & RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2007); Kate
Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the
US, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 196, 208–10 (2007).
240. Mallory Factor, Capital Markets Reform—Now!, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2006, 12:00
PM), https://www.forbes.com/2006/12/05/congress-capital-markets-reform-oped-cx_mf_
1205mallory.html#395433835efe [https://perma.cc/U393-K6LR].
241. Barbara Black, Introduction: The Globalization of Securities Regulation—Competition
or Coordination?, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 462 (2011).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 462–63.
244. See Pankaj Ghemawat, Globalization in the Age of Trump, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July-Aug. 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/globalization-in-the-age-of-trump [https://perma.cc/
UZA8-XSYA].
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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a more interconnected world.249 An example of President Obama’s
commitment to globalization was his response to the Brexit initiative in
Great Britain in 2016, an event which created a fair amount of doubt as to
the future of globalization, when he said that the “integration of national
economies into a global economy” was omnipresent.250
The Economist published a cover story “The Retreat of the Global
Company,” in which it proclaimed that “the biggest business idea of the
past three decades is in deep trouble” and that “the advantages of scale and . . .
arbitrage have worn away.”251 Conversely, Jeffrey Immelt, previous chairman
and CEO of General Electric, talked about the GE’s “bold pivot” from
globalization to localization.252 These differing views are evidence that the
issue is far from resolved.
Obama’s presidential successor, Donald Trump, made apparent his
substantial opposition to globalization during his presidential campaign in
2016.253 In the midst of Trump’s campaign, President Obama argued that
there was no turning back from an interconnected world.254 Toward the
end of Obama’s presidency in November 2016, he cautioned, “in the years
and decades ahead, our countries have to make sure that the benefits of an
integrated global economy are more broadly shared by more people, and
that the negative impacts are squarely addressed.”255
President Trump has continuously advocated for a new era of protectionism.256
For example, President Trump constantly discussed tariffs against China

249. See Perry Bacon Jr., Trump’s and Obama’s Views on Globalization Reflect
Broader Gap, NBC NEWS (July 4, 2016, 9:56 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-thepress/trump-s-obama-s-views-globalization-reflect-broader-gap-n601901 [https://perma.cc/
6FM5-ZVUG].
250. Brian Naylor, Obama: Globalization is ‘Here’ and ‘Done’, NPR: POL. (June 29,
2016, 6:41 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/29/484087513/obama-globalization-is-hereand-done [https://perma.cc/4L7M-WGDC].
251. Ghemawat, supra note 244.
252. Id.
253. Bacon, supra note 249.
254. Juliet Eilperin, Obama in Athens: ‘The Current Path of Globalization Needs a Course
Correction,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/11/16/obama-in-athens-the-current-path-of-globalization-needs-a-coursecorrection/?utm_term=.0370d95c5931 [https://perma.cc/6JZP-S7TK].
255. Id.
256. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Rethinking Globalization in the Trump Era: US-China Relations
2 (June 2017) (working paper) (available at http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/06/Stiglitz_The-Retreat-from-Globalization-and-its-Implications-for-China_M.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NM7-4QDJ]).
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and Mexico and a renegotiation of NAFTA in his first year in office.257
On January 20, 2018, President Trump approved heavy tariffs on imports of
washing machines and solar energy cells and panels, which was the first
major step by the administration in implementing the trade barriers Trump
frequently mentioned.258 President Trump’s “America First” approach is
likely to also lead to additional trade measures related to steel, aluminum,
and other Chinese products.259 However, the imposition of tariffs on China
will likely not have significant impacts on China’s multilateral trade deficit
because China will divert trade to other emerging markets.260 Additionally, the
vast number of international institutions in place that help the world maintain
an open yet regulated trading and financial system, such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
are likely to limit the Trump presidency’s effects on globalization.261
These international institutions have expanded their mandates and
increased their oversight since they were put in place after World War II
to prevent another Great Depression.262 However, since the beginning of
the twenty-first century, these institutions have become highly contested
from both the left and right wings of the political spectrum.263 Right-wing
critics view these institutions as detrimentally replacing market roles and
restricting efficient, market-promoting policies.264 On the other hand, critics
from the left believe these institutions are tools for the rich countries
to dominate developing countries.265 Nevertheless, these international
institutions have been largely beneficial for their member countries.266
Globalization has been a relevant topic of discussion amongst international
policymakers at the beginning of 2018, one year after President Trump’s
election.267 At the Asian Financial Forum on January 11, 2018, International
257. Id.
258. Brad Plumer & Ana Swanson, Trump Slaps Steep Tariffs on Foreign Washing
Machines and Solar Products, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
01/22/business/trump-tariffs-washing-machines-solar-panels.html [https://perma.cc/B3DX3G2B].
259. Id.
260. See Stiglitz, supra note 256, at 4.
261. Id. at 2.
262. Helen V. Milner, Globalization, Development, and International Institutions:
Normative and Positive Perspectives, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 833, 833 (2015).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 833–34.
267. See generally Jason Karaian, At Davos, Cheerleaders for Globalization Puzzle
Over How to Save It from Itself, QUARTZ (Jan. 23, 2018) (describing the hot topic of globalization
in talks at the annual World Economic Forum), https://qz.com/1187219/davos-how-to-fixglobalization-with-chanda-kochhar-devin-wenig-mauricio-cardenas-minouche-shafik/
[https://perma.cc/4S6G-8773].
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Monetary Fund First Deputy Managing Director David Lipton encouraged
Chinese policymakers to loosen trade and investment restrictions in order
to play a leading role in globalization.268 On January 24, 2018, a panel of
distinguished business leaders, such as Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwarzman
and Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan, discussed the ways countries
are gaining competitive advantages in the global market and how that is
likely to affect the state of globalization.269 Europe has focused on making
Germany and France more competitive because much of Europe’s economic
success stems from that region. 270 The U.S. is trying to become more
competitive through tax legislation and corporate deregulation.271 President
Trump’s tax reform bill, which he signed into law at the end of 2017,
makes the U.S. tax system more closely resemble those of other countries,
which in turn drives more natural behavior within the global economy.272
The President and CEO of the Federal Bank of New York, William Dudley,
also said the debate about the benefits and challenges of globalization was
a hot topic, in his 2017 speech at the Bombay Stock Exchange.273 He
stressed the importance of globalization’s role in all economies across the
world and said, “if support for liberalized trade and an integrated global
economy were to suffer a significant setback, the consequence could be
slower economic growth and lower living standards around the world.”274
In discussing the pace of globalization, Dudley emphasized the dramatic
increase in global economic integration, and argued for preserving globalization,
because “economies have become more integrated and interdependent.”275
If globalization were to suffer a setback during the Trump presidency,
the world would nevertheless remain more globalized in terms of trade and

268. Enda Curran & Stephen Engle, IMF Says China Must Fix Shortcomings to Lead
Globalization, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2018-01-15/imf-says-china-must-address-shortcomings-to-lead-globalization [https://perma.cc/
A22E-Q2B3].
269. Biz Leaders Talk ‘Global Markets in a Fractured World’ (Fox Business broadcast
Jan. 24, 2018), https://video.foxbusiness.com/v/5718608069001/#sp=show-clips [https://
perma.cc/2HHL-B7M6].
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of
N.Y., Remarks at the Bombay Stock Exchange, Mumbai, India: Benefits and Challenges
from Globalization (May 11, 2017).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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foreign direct investment than it was in the entire nineteenth century.276
Additionally, international activity has not slowed significantly since the
global financial crisis, notwithstanding the first year of Trump’s presidency.277
Thus, it still stands unclear whether a retreat from globalization is on
the horizon.278 The interconnectedness and interdependencies of global
economies remains and will continue to remain for the foreseeable future—
it is only a matter of degrees. Although a country’s economic system will
always have separate and distinct characteristics from others, policymakers
in the U.S. and across the globe must to take into account the fact that
international economies are and will continue to be interconnected and
interdependent. This will avoid, or at least mitigate, many of the issues
that precipitated the global financial crisis.
V. CONCLUSION: WHY A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE WORKS
Asset-backed securitization has proven to be a successful method of wealth
generation all across the world. While global markets have recovered from
the subprime mortgage crisis, the U.S. focused on preventative measures
to avoid future economic collapse. The reform in response to the crisis has
adequately addressed certain intra-bank practices that were causal in
the economic downturn. However, undue systemic risks still exist. The
interconnectedness of global markets, as well as certain securitization practices
outside the U.S., have set the stage for additional reforms that must focus
on international market interactions and market failures.
International regulatory structures, such as the one in Germany created
by the German Pfandbrief Act, can be useful and applicable and inform
further actions that are compatible with, and supplemental to, existing U.S.
reforms that followed the financial crisis. The Basel Committee’s agenda,
which was established to be applied internationally, explicitly mentions
its intent to consider including synthetic securitization in the upcoming
Basel revision of Basel III. In order to address the obvious and persistent
challenges of incentives, externalities, transparency, and market failures
discussed in this Article, U.S. policymakers must seriously evaluate how
to capture and implement those relevant aspects of synthetic securitization
practices that have already proven successful. Much is still yet to be done!
The unity of effort to confront and solve these systemic challenges is a
generational opportunity and responsibility. Left unattended, these very
same, and still unresolved, challenges will predictably result in yet another
276. Ghemawat, supra note 244.
277. INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: IS GROWTH AT
RISK? 6–9 (2017).
278. Ghemawat, supra note 244.
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global financial crisis—one with far greater consequences that could possibly
result in political, institutional, and social collapse in the industrialized
world.
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